Cournot Competition

Cournot’s 1838 model of strategic interaction between competing firms has become the primary workhorse for the analysis of imperfect competition, and shows up in a variety of fields, notably industrial organization and international trade. This article begins with a tour of the basic Cournot model and its properties, touching on existence, uniqueness, stability, and efficiency; this discussion especially emphasizes considerations involved in using the Cournot model in multi-stage applications. A discussion of recent applications is provided as well as a reference to an extended bibliography of approximately 125 selected publications from 2001 through 2005.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

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Cournot Competition

Duopoly

Duopoly

Bibliography

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1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5 Andrew F. Daughety

1. Andrew F. Daughety